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Events and children’s sense of time:
a perspective on the origins of
everyday time-keeping
Helen Forman*
Department of Psychology, University of Umeå, Umeå, Sweden
In this article I discuss abstract or pure time versus the content of time, (i.e., events,
activities, and other goings-on). Or, more specifically, the utility of these two sorts
of time in time-keeping or temporal organization. It is often assumed that abstract,
uniform, and objective time is a universal physical entity out there, which humans may
perceive of. However, this sort of evenly flowing time was only recently introduced to
the human community, together with the mechanical clock. Before the introduction of
mechanical clock-time, there were only events available to denote the extent of time.
Events defined time, unlike the way time may define events in our present day culture. It
is therefore conceivable that our primeval or natural mode of time-keeping involves the
perception, estimation, and coordination of events. I find it likely that events continues
to subserve our sense of time and time-keeping efforts, especially for children who have
not yet mastered the use of clock-time. Instead of seeing events as a distraction to our
perception of time, I suggest that our experience and understanding of time emerges
from our perception of events.
Keywords: sense of time, time-keeping, temporal organization, event knowledge, events, time perception, event
perception, children
Introduction
The ability to keep track of events, activities, and other goings-on in our environment is of funda-
mental importance for our adaptation to the conditions of our earthly habitat. In everyday life, we
need to organize and coordinate our own activities with that of others in our community. This abil-
ity for perceiving the constellation of events around us, how they are conﬁgured in relation to each
other as well as to ourselves, is what makes the cross-temporal organization of our everyday lives at
all possible. Both the ability to perceive these events and the ability to organize our own activities
in concordance with the conﬁguration of these events, is often referred to as having a Sense of time.
Time in itself is not the main objective, though, but the events that may be gauged in terms of their
temporal extent. This is so, because every event has a temporal aspect. Cross-temporal organization
of behavior would perhaps, be another way of describing this ability, but I have chosen the shorter
term time-keeping.
Initially my project was to investigate the ability for time-keeping in children, but for reasons
explicated in the following account, I found it necessary to take a closer look at time-keeping
generally.
In our present day culture we have amagniﬁcent tool for time keeping at our disposal in the form
of standardized time units or clock-time. The duration of any event or activity can be translated
into uniform and objective time units. This way, events may be measured, added up and compared,
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forward, backward, and sideways, any way you like, in a per-
fectly objective and reliable manner. The process is somewhat
analogous to how we use money for reasoning about and car-
rying out transactions concerning value. Money is a token of
value or an abstraction of value. Any and every traded com-
modity may be translated into the abstract value of money.
In the same way we may reason about and carry out transac-
tions involving events and activities in terms of standardized
clock-time.
Children, however, do not have access to this tool as their skills
in time-keeping by means of clock-time is limited. Even though
they learn how to read a clock, to tell time, during their early
school years, it takes them a long time to learn to translate their
experience into standardized time units (Harner, 1982; Friedman,
1986; Levin, 1992; Pouthas, 1993). How long is an hour? How
much of a certain activity can ﬁt within an hour or 20 min? What
do I have to do now in order to be ready to leave for school
in 10 min? These are the sort of temporal tasks children strug-
gle with and for which they will need support from parents and
teachers for many years.
Consequently, when investigating children’s developing sense
of time or time-keeping ability, any method involving clock-time
is unsuitable. Neither would it be meaningful to look for devel-
opmental precursors of clock-time mastery. Since clock-time is
such a late contrivance of the human community, we cannot
expect to ﬁnd an innately based capacity for clock-time. Now,
someone might object, even though the mechanical clock is of a
recent date, time itself has always been the same and the mechan-
ical clock is only a more eﬃcient way of keeping track of it.
From our viewpoint of the 21st century this is how it may seem,
immersed as we are in standardized, uniform, and abstract clock-
time. However, it is a misunderstanding. The introduction of the
mechanical clock, meant more than just a more eﬃcient tech-
nology, it also introduced a new and diﬀerent sort of time – a
uniform, evenly ﬂowing time. While other modern instruments
enabled the detection of previously undetectable natural phe-
nomena such as radiation, the mechanical clock created its own
new phenomenon.
A Short History of Time-Keeping
Devices
Temporal organization involving days, months, and years has
been around in the human community for millennia. Cyclically
recurring celestial events such as the day-night cycle, the cycle
of the sun, the cycles of the moon’s phases have informed the
construction of calendars since the early days of human com-
munities. It is in principle not too mysterious. The cyclic events
are there for the counting, the only requirement is to keep your
eyes open and devise a method for keeping track of the cycles.
These cyclic natural events then become a back-drop, against
which other events may be gaged. This is a simpliﬁed descrip-
tion to make a point. In reality, there are records of systematic
observations of temporal patterns in the movement of heavenly
bodies of all kinds. Not only the most salient, like the sun and the
moon. But in principle, even an uneducated stone-age man could
construct a simple calendar based on these most obvious celestial
events.
However, for temporal organization within the day (the 24 h
cycle of the earth’s rotation around its axis), there are no nat-
ural cycles to count. In ancient civilizations such as Egypt and
Babylon sundials and water-clocks were used to aid time-keeping.
The principle of the sundial is to subdivide the cycle of the
sun into equal units. The Egyptians divided the day in 12 h,
but these hours were not standardized to be uniform the way
our modern hours are. They would vary in length with the
season. (These unequal hours are sometimes referred to as tem-
poral hours or true time; Landes, 2000) Thus the temporal units
of the sundials could not be used as an objective measure of
time, e.g., the duration of an event. They could unambiguously
only indicate points in time such as sunrise, high noon, and
sunset, which also could be determined simply by eyeballing
the sky.
In overcast weather and at night, when the sundial does not
work, the water-clock was useful. The principle of the water-clock
is diﬀerent than that of the sundial. Instead of subdividing the
duration of a known event (the suns movement across the sky)
an event is created (the slow drip of water in or out of a vessel)
and then the accumulated events (the volume of water) are mea-
sured. Interestingly, in antiquity the water-clock was calibrated
to conform to the sundial. It had a diﬀerent scale for diﬀerent
months, even though the technology would easily have allowed
for the introduction of standardized time units. This means that,
a question such as: – What time does the sun set? – would, in
ancient Greece, be met with incredulity, and your interlocutor
would, while speaking very slowly, explain to you that at sunset
the time is SUNSET!
Thus, for most of human history, time-keeping has been a
matter of gauging one event against another. Alexander Zsalai’s
comment about time in antiquity comes to mind: “In his time
(Heroditus’), and even much later, human activity served much
more as a measure of time and not the other way around.” (Szalai,
1966, described in Levine, 2006). In other words, rather than
having time deﬁne events, events deﬁned time. This sort of event-
time is still in use in some places. If you were to ask a person
in rural Burundi when he wants to meet, he might say that he
will meet you when the young cows go out. In some parts of
Madagascar, a question about how long time something takes
might produce an answer like the time of a rice-cooking (about
half an hour; Levine, 2006).
The Mechanical Clock – A Paradigm
Shift in Our Conceptualization of Time
The mechanical clock dates back to the end of the 13th century.
The principle of its operation was similar to the water-clock –
a uniform, artiﬁcial event was generated, and then the event
was repeated, while keeping an accumulative count. Unlike the
clepsydra, the mechanical clock technology did not allow for cal-
ibration with a sundial. It could not handle the ever-changing
temporal hour. A standard had to be chosen and the choice fell
on (subdivisions of) a mean solar-day. The mechanical clocks
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were at ﬁrst not very good and they did not indicate min-
utes. Eventually they improved and in the 17th century when
a pendulum was added to the construction, the resulting clock
looked like our modern clocks and performed almost as well
(Lundmark, 1989; Dorn-van Rossum, 1996; Landes, 2000; NIST,
2009).
The mechanical clock brought about a new sort of time;
uniform, objective, and abstract, free of its content. It created
uniform units for abstract time. People have always known of an
abstract time, beyond or behind the events, i.e., chores could be
ﬁnished sooner or later, the length of the day varied with the sea-
sons. But without units, abstract time is truly evasive and of little
practical use in time-keeping.
Summary So Far
I think it is safe to say that for time-keeping, the event-timemode
has been the standard for a vastly longer period of human exis-
tence than has time-keeping by means of clock-time. Therefore
I ﬁnd it unlikely that humans would be equipped with a built-in
ability to detect abstract, uniform, and objective time as this sort
of time is a product of the mechanical clock. I think it is more
likely that our ability to operate with clock-time overlays the older
event-time mode. Perceiving abstract, uniform, and objective
clock-time is likely a learned skill which entails translating our
experience of events into clock-time units.
Events
One of the most repeated passages, a Locus Classicus, in the
literature on psychological time, is an anecdote of how events
sometimes distort our estimation of time. It typically reads some-
thing like this: – Have you noticed how, when you are engaged in
or observing a rousing, entertaining or novel event, time seems to
pass rapidly, while time seems to drag when nothing much is hap-
pening or the event is a boring one. Generally the analysis ends
there. The assumption seems to be that the temporal informa-
tion embedded in events is inherently unreliable, and events are
therefore rejected as a source of temporal information. I think this
rejection may be a bit premature. Undoubtedly, there are extraor-
dinarily captivating events whichmake us forget about everything
else, as well as sluggish ones that never seem to end, but these
are at the extreme ends of the scale. There are also events some-
where in the middle, appealing or important enough to keep your
attention up, but not so to make us lose sight of other matters of
the day.
Of particular interest for the account presented here is a class
of events which we have experienced many times, and regarding
which we possess a substantial amount of knowledge or event-
knowledge. These are the events and activities of everyday life
which are so familiar to us that the memories of them come to
possess a schema- or script-like character. This type of events are
frequently referred to as everyday events, routine events, or recur-
ring events. Given that it is logically impossible for the same event
to happen more than once, our minds are apparently not con-
forming to the rules of logic in this matter. This is more than
a lucky accident, since our event-scripts are so useful to us. An
event-script may scaﬀold our memory so that we don’t have to
remember everything from scratch; we know how the type of
event usually unfolds. It guides our perception and attention so
that we may interpret a situation quicker; we know what to look
for. If we know how an event usually unfolds, we maymake better
predictions about what will happen next and what actions to take.
(Zacks et al., 2007; Sargent et al., 2013). Furthermore, it is a mat-
ter of cognitive ergonomy; to process a routine event requires less
resources than if we had to perceive or interpret it from scratch,
as a novel event, every time. This way we may reserve resources
for dealing with unexpected and perhaps dangerous occurrences.
As the event scripts are acquired through individual experi-
ence, we might expect a certain amount of variation between
individuals. And there are diﬀerences, but also a surprisingly
good agreement between individuals regarding what constituent
parts makes up a certain type of event (Bower et al., 1979), and
between and within individuals in how events are temporally
structured (Newtson, 1976; Zacks and Tversky, 2001; Speer et al.,
2003). The consistency in how we perceive everyday events
implies that our experience can be communicated and reasoned
about together with others, which is very helpful in temporal
organization endeavors.
Children and Events
Contrary to the traditional belief that young children’s skills are
poor in representing and remembering an event sequence (Piaget,
1926, 1969; Fraisse, 1963), Nelson and Gruendel (1981), found
that even quite young children have generalized, temporally orga-
nized representations of familiar, everyday events (Nelson, 1986,
1996). Children, as young as 3 years, can when asked about famil-
iar events, such as going to a birthday party or having lunch
at their preschool, verbally report the component acts of these
events in correct temporal order. And already at the age of 4, chil-
dren begin to grasp temporal relations among everyday events,
such as waking, eating lunch, eating dinner, and going to bed
(Friedman, 1977, 1982, 1990). Young children accomplish these
tasks with the help of script-like event representations. The event
scripts help them predict the course of events in everyday life as
well as guiding action and attention; they serve as representation
of past experience, and helps with the interpretation of present
experience of events.
For children the event scripts also have a more profound
function as they may be the child’s earliest form of knowledge
representation and as such a basic building block of cognition
that serve as a foundation for more complex cognitive structures
(Nelson and Gruendel, 1981, p. 150, 155; Lucariello and Rifkin,
1986). Children’s event representations eventually give rise
to more abstract forms of knowledge, such as concepts and
categories and also support language acquisition. Logical and
temporal relations ﬁrst appears in the context of event repre-
sentations. Time and temporal relations “is a basic dimension of
action, activity, and event structure” (Nelson, 1996, p 259) and
thus part of the child’s experience of events. Two basic dimen-
sions of time, duration, and sequence (e.g., Fraisse, 1963), are also
basic and indispensable dimensions of events. In turn, these basic
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dimensions embed other time concepts such as before and after,
while, now, and soon. Thus, a basic understanding of temporal
relations is implicit in the young children’s knowledge of events.
The trick that children are expected to, and eventually come to
master is to translate their event experience into clock-time and
its linguistic representations (Nelson, 1996). In Nelson’s view,
language is crucial to children’s development of time knowl-
edge because language is an important mediator of knowledge.
Language makes it possible to construct abstract concepts and
complex representations that go beyond the more basic ones
acquired from direct experience of events (Nelson, 1996).
I agree with Nelson, but I would like to add that perhaps the
experience and understanding of events also have a more direct
eﬀect on children’s emerging knowledge of time, as our primor-
dial mode of experiencing and understanding timemay be by way
of events.
What Events?
In psychology and philosophy events are sometimes deﬁned as
simply a change (e.g., Rey, 2015)(Ducasse, 1926; von Wright,
1963, described in Casati and Varzi, 2014). Though, for the
time-keeping discourse presented here, a single change doesn’t
qualify as an event. Neither does a series of unrelated changes,
although they may (or may not) give rise to some sort of tem-
poral experience. To be functional in time-keeping, the event
must consist of a series of related changes, i.e., a coherent every-
day event with a beginning, a middle, and an end. This sort of
event is perceived as a unit because it has a meaning; a purpose
or an end state. A broad and informal deﬁnition would be Go-
together goings-on. Most importantly, this is the sort of events
which make up much of everyday life and from which we may
form event-scripts and event conﬁguration scripts.
A change could be part of this event but any random change
does not necessarily constitute a time-keeping event. Thus, this
sort of event contains not only changes, but also continuity. In
everyday life we experience events such as going to work, clean-
ing up after dinner, playing a game of soccer. Events of this type
and on this scale are the ones we need to choreograph as we
maneuver through an ordinary day in real life. Consequently
it is events of this sort and on this scale that are of interest
here. Katherine Nelson’s description captures the gist of everyday
events well: “. . .they involve people in purposeful activities, and
acting on objects and interacting with each other to achieve some
result” (Nelson, 1986, p 11). Thus, the meaning of event in
FIGURE 1 | Mental event-model of temporal relations among four events.
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this article has more in common with its meaning in every-
day language than with its meaning in Philosophy or any other
academic discipline.
The aim of the research described above was not to
uncover the processes underlying time-keeping, but I think
these results indicate that event representations play an impor-
tant role in everyday life and furthermore, that events are
not merely random noise but are perceived in a consistent
and lawful manner. This in turn suggests that event-time and
time-keeping by way of events possibly still is part of our
cognitive repertoire. In my view, our modern way of time-
keeping most likely consists of event-time together with clock-
time. Children may, however, rely more on event-time and
it may therefore be advantageous to investigate the develop-
ment of time-keeping ability or sense of time in the context of
events.
Event Based Time-Keeping
So What Would a Time-Keeping Task by
Means of Event-Time be Like? The Figure
(Figure 1) Shows an Example
Reasoning in terms of temporal relations among events entails a
sort of mental time-travel. By constructing a mental event-model
we may stop time for a moment, so that we may, in our minds,
travel forward in time, and also backward to try out diﬀerent
alternatives. As some of the events overlap, we must also travel
sideways.
With their greater repertoire of event-representations and
greater general processing resources, adults are obviously more
competent event based time-keepers than children. In my opin-
ion, it is the precursors of this competency we should look for
when investigating children’s sense of time.
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